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In labor markets where disadvantaged students are discriminated against, merit-based college 
scholarships targeting these students could convey two opposing signals to employers. There 
is a positive signal reflecting the candidate’s cognitive ability (talented in high-school and able 
to maintain a high GPA in college) as well as her soft skills (overcoming poverty). There is also a 
possible negative signal as the targeting of the scholarship indicates that the beneficiary comes 
from a disadvantaged household. We conduct a correspondence study to analyze the labor 
market impact of an inclusive education program. Beca 18 provides merit-based scholarships to 
talented poor students admitted to 3-year and 5-year colleges in Peru. We find that the positive 
signal dominates. Including information of being a scholarship recipient increases the likelihood 
of getting a callback for a job interview by 20%. However, the effect is much smaller in jobs 
and careers where the poor are under-represented, suggesting that the negative signal of the 
scholarship is not zero.
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Worldwide, students from disadvantaged backgrounds are largely under-represented in higher 
education (UNESCO, 2020; Ferreyra et al., 2017), despite the documented high skill earnings 
premium (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 2020; Goldin and Katz, 2008). This is more salient in 
developing countries, where returns to postsecondary education are higher and credit constraints 
are more pronounced than in advanced economies. New work has started to emerge on the role 
of financial aid and student loan programs on access to college for high-achieving low-income 
students in middle-income countries (e.g., Londoño-Vélez et al., 2020; Solis, 2017).2 Yet, little is 
known about the labor market returns of these merit-based scholarships. 
To address this gap, we study the labor market impact of a scholarship for talented but 
disadvantaged students in Peru. This program, called Beca 18 (“Scholarship 18”), was created 
in 2011, and is the largest public program financing higher education in the country. Beca 18 is a 
highly competitive scholarship. Only five percent of applicants receive it every year. It is also a 
very generous scholarship to attend selected public or private colleges in the country. It covers 
full tuition costs plus all living expenses, books, moving costs, a laptop, health insurance and 
academic tutors, if needed. To satisfy its mandate to reduce the socioeconomic gap in access to 
higher education in Peru, Beca 18 targets students from the bottom two quintiles of the country’s 
poverty assessment, in which indigenous groups are severely over-represented. 
However, in labor markets where indigenous groups are discriminated against as in the case 
of Peru (e.g., Galarza and Yamada, 2014, 2017), a merit-based scholarship for disadvantaged 
students could convey two possible signals to employers. First, there is a positive signal in terms 
of ability. A Beca 18 beneficiary had to be a top student in high school to become eligible and 
to score very well in a qualifying standardized test and be admitted to a selective college to be 
awarded the scholarship. She had to maintain a high GPA during college as well. All these sends 
a signal of strong cognitive skills. Beneficiaries also had to overcome poverty, showing resilience 
as well as important “soft” skills.  Second, there is a negative signal due to poverty and ethnicity. 
The targeting of the scholarship clearly indicates that the recipient comes from a disadvantaged 
household, which correlates with a lower social status and indigenous background. Thus, the 
impact of Beca 18 to employers would depend on how the market values these two competing 
signals. If the ability signal is larger than the poverty signal, Beca 18 will have a positive impact on 
employment. Otherwise, it would hurt candidates. 
If beneficiaries perceive that the poverty signal dominates, they will avoid listing Beca 18 in 
their resumes. We found evidence supporting this view. From a sample of resumes from actual 
beneficiaries, less than 5% listed the scholarship. Those who did it, place it as the last item in 
their resumes and without highlighting it. However, not including this award in their resume 
could be an inefficient behavior if employers value the ability signal much more than the poverty 
signal. Thus, we need to test how the labor market reacts to the Beca 18 signal.
We implement a correspondence audit study to examine the impact of Beca 18 on employment 
opportunities for technical (for 3-year college graduates) and professional occupations (5-year 
college graduates).3 Nearly 3500 fictitious resumes were sent in response to 877 job ads in Lima, 
Peru’s capital and largest labor market (concentrating 44% of the country’s labor force). For each 
job we sent four resumes, randomly assigning all elements of the resumes, including the listing 
of Beca 18. These resumes mimicked those from true beneficiaries of Beca 18 in terms of style 
and structure, except that we make the information about the scholarship salient. We find that 
listing Beca 18 in the resume increases the likelihood to be called back for a job interview by 20%. 
2 For research on these programs in advanced economies see for example Angrist et al. (2014), Bettinger et al. (2019), Fack 
and Grenet (2015).
3 As explained below, Peru’s high school education ends in grade 11 (not 12) and the higher education system has 3-year 
(technical) and 5-year (professional) colleges.
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This finding implies that the ability signal exceeds the poverty signal. Beneficiaries of Beca 18 are 
leaving “money on the table” by not listing the scholarship in their resumes.
To understand better the role of each signal, we conducted a heterogeneity analysis dividing 
the sample by jobs, careers and place of residence. The intuition is that the negative signal from 
poverty will be less (more) salient in the subgroups where the poor are (under-) over-represented. 
We find evidence supporting this prediction. For example, we show that gains from listing Beca 18 
in the resume is concentrated among 3-year college graduates, where the poor are more likely to 
graduate from. The gains in callback rates increases to 39% in this subsample. For graduates from 
5-year colleges, where the poor are under-represented, the effect is just 6% and not statistically 
different from zero. These findings suggest that the negative signal is not zero when the poor are 
underrepresented.
One potentially additional impact of Beca 18 is the reduction of ethnic gaps, not only in terms of 
college enrollment and graduation rates, but also in labor market outcomes, a topic over which 
the literature is particularly scarce. Using surnames as an ethnic signal, we find that the return to 
Beca 18 is the largest among job applicants with paternal and maternal indigenous surnames, a 
result suggesting a greater ethnic equality in the access to the labor market. 
We contribute to two strands of the literature. First, the literature on the impact of financial 
aid and loan programs for higher education has largely focused on enrollment (see, e.g., 
Angrist et al. 2014; Bettinger et al. 2019, and Fack and Grenet 2015, for developed countries, 
and Londoño-Velez et al., 2020; Laajaj et al., 2018 and Solis, 2017, for developing countries). We 
contribute to this area of study, by examining how the labor market responds to a merit-based 
and need-based scholarship program. That is, we extend the analysis of the impact of these type 
of programs beyond college graduation, a topic over which the literature in developing countries 
is particularly scant.
Second, the fast-growing literature on correspondence studies (CS) has been widely used to 
detect ethnic and gender discrimination in the labor market, both in developed and developing 
countries (see Neumark, 2018 and Baert, 2018 for recent reviews). While their results are 
revealing, it is unclear from existing CS which policy prescription to use to increase employment 
opportunities for disadvantaged groups. This is particularly relevant since anonymous job 
applications do not seem to help as much, as Behaghel et al. (2015) shows for France. We evaluate 
the effect of an inclusive education policy on higher access to the labor market, as an alternative 
to using anonymous resumes. We posit that, while an affirmative action policy could reinforce 
discrimination (Coates and Loury, 1993), sending a signal of ability could address, at least partly, 
the issue, depending on how the poverty and ability signals are perceived in the labor market.4 
We are not aware of other CS examining this labor market effect of similar programs.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides information about the Beca 
18 program (coverage, requirements, and outreach). Section 3 presents our experimental design. 
Section 4 introduces our data. Section 5 discusses our results and section 6 concludes.
4 We focus on hiring because this program is too young as to analyze other labor market outcomes, such as its impact on 
wages. This extension to analyze the human capital impact of the program is an important topic for future research.
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2. Beca 18 program
Created in late 2011, Beca 18 began to operate the following year as the first full scholarship 
program for higher education funded by the national government in Peru.5 With the aim to 
reduce the poor’s unequal access to higher education, Beca 18 funds full tuition and related 
expenses of young talented students coming from poor households who have been admitted to 
selective private and public universities (5-year college degrees) and technical institutions (3-year 
college degrees). Beca 18 granted 65.826 scholarships from 2012 to 2019, with some changes 
in administrative issues of the application but keeping its focus on talented students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. About two thirds of the scholarships were granted to fund 3-year 
technical degrees.
All Peruvian nationals attending—or graduated from—a public high school, interested in applying 
for a scholarship need to pass a pre-selection process, summarized in Appendix Figure 1. The 
eligibility criteria is based on age (under 22), household poverty condition (verified by SISFOH, 
the national system of household targeting for social programs), and academic merit (top third 
in GPA in the last two years prior to their application).6 In addition, Beca 18 pre-candidates must 
take a national test of math and reading comprehension, in order to qualify for the final round. 
The final ranking considers test scores plus some bonus points awarded to applicants in priority 
situations including indigenous groups.7 As shown in Appendix Figure 1, using numbers from 
the 2019 process, only about one tenth of applicants (4,539 out of 43,906) made it to this stage, 
given the budget constraint of the program. An additional third of applicants were eliminated 
in the final round of the process, considering admission and quality of the colleges and careers 
chosen.8 Only 3,139 scholarships were ultimately granted that year, yielding a success rate of 
5.19%. 
Beca 18 covers full tuition costs of attending a public or private 3-year or 5-year colleges. It also 
covers course materials, tuition to study English (only for 5-year colleges), academic tutoring, and 
a laptop, in addition to health insurance, living expenses (food, housing), local transportation, 
and a round-trip ticket to the place of residence, if applicable.9
Merit-based higher education scholarships targeting to the poor are also available in other Latin 
American countries, such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica, though we are not aware of 
studies of the effect of those scholarship programs on labor market access. Table 1 summarizes 
the characteristics of relatively large public programs for higher education scholarships in the 
region. With 84.8 U.S. million dollars of budget spent in 2019, Beca 18 ranks first in terms of relative 
fiscal effort devoted to finance the program (0.27% of central government budget), though it is 
the smallest program in the sample, both, in terms of absolute numbers of beneficiaries (15.619 
in 2019) and relative to total enrollment in higher education (0.87%).
5 Prior to Beca 18, PRONABEC, the Ministry of Education office in charge of administering the program, had only had 
short-term loans financing tuition expenses for less than a year.
6 Students can apply during their senior year (11th grade) but also after high school graduation as long as they are younger 
than 22.
7 Other criteria rising eligibility are disability, active firefighter (or children of firefighter), volunteers registered by the 
Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations, farmers, and Afro-descendant population.
8 Quality indicators include the college ranking (which is based on scientific production, faculty with undergraduate or 
graduate degrees, and instructor/student ratio), graduation rates, and average wages of graduates. All these indicators 
are used to construct a list of prioritized colleges, whose ranking is used to award the bonus points for college quality. In 
terms of careers, bonus points are awarded in direct relationship to their economic returns, and to whether those careers 
belong to areas of science and technology prioritized in the 2006-2021 National Strategic Plan of Science, Technology, 
and Innovation for the Competitiveness and Human Development (life sciences, biotechnology, material technology 
and science, information and communication technologies, environmental science, and basic sciences—mathematics, 
chemistry physics, biology, geology, and geophysics).
9 A significant proportion of the scholarship recipients are born in a rural place and choose to migrate and study in a 
college located in Lima. As of 2016, only 13% of the recipients reside in Lima but 53% of all recipients chose to attend a 
college in Lima.
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Table 1: A Sample of Government-Funded Higher Education Scholarship Programs in Latin America























1) Gross family income of up to 3 minimum wages.
2) Minimum score in the Exame Nacional do 
Ensino Médio.
224,921 (2019) 2.66 549.4 0.09b
Beca 
Bicentenario Chile
1) Belong to bottom 70% of household income 
distribution.
2) Minimum score in the University Selection Test. 
3) Be enrolled in an eligible institution and 
educational field.
34,755 (2017) 5.27 140.5 0.22
Ser Pilo Paga Colombia
1) Be registered in the System of Selection of 
Beneficiaries for Social Programs (SISBEN).
2) Minimum score in the national test “Saber 11”.
3) Be admitted in an eligible institution.
40,000c (2018) 1.79 253.9 0.04
Beca 
Universitaria Costa Rica
1) Poverty or extreme poverty condition accredited 
by SINIRUBE.
2) High academic performance (last period grades).
3) Be enrolled in an institution and in a career 
recognized by CONESUP.
4,522  (2019) 2.17 5.9 0.15
Beca 18 Peru
1) Poverty or extreme poverty condition accredited 
by SISFOH.
2) Top third in GPA in last two years of secondary 
education and minimum score in the pre-selection 
test.
3) Be admitted in an eligible institution and 
educational field.
15,619 (2019) 0.87 84.8 0.27
Sources: Banco Central do Brasil, Ministério da Educação (Brazil), Ministério da Economia (Brazil), Banco Central de Chile, Ministerio de Educación (Chile), Consejo 
Nacional de Educación (Chile), Ministerio de Hacienda (Chile), Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia, Ministerio de Educación (Colombia), Ministerio de Hacienda 
y Crédito Público (Colombia), Banco Central de Costa Rica, FONABE, Programa Estado de la Nación (Costa Rica), Ministerio de Hacienda (Costa Rica), SBS, Ministerio de 
Economía y Finanzas (Peru), PRONABEC, SUNEDU, Ministerio de Educación (Peru), and World Bank (2019).
Notes:
a. In the case of Brazil, Costa Rica and Peru, the figures for total student population are of 2018, 2015 and 2016, respectively.
b. The central government expenditure figure is of 2018. In the first three quarters, spending in 2018 is similar to that of 2019.
c. Target number according to government announcements.
There are several potential effects that a scholarship program such as Beca 18 can have. In the 
short-term, it can increase higher education enrollment rates for ethnic minorities (indigenous 
and afro-descendants) and it may also increase graduation rates (thus increasing human capital 
accumulation). In the medium-term, the program may increase access to the labor market for 
poor people. And in the long run, it may ultimately reduce the ethnic income gap. We study the 
effect of Beca 18 on the increase in employment opportunities. As described before, we posit that 
being recipient of Beca 18 sends (at least) two signals to the market: the job applicant is talented 
(positive signal) but poor (negative signal). In this framework, the impact of Beca 18 on the labor 
market will depend on how employers read those signals: if the ability signal is stronger (weaker) 
than the poverty signal, Beca 18 will have a positive (negative) effect on hiring chances.
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3. Experimental design
We use a paired correspondence study design and sent four resumes in response to each 
selected job ad. We use the resume randomizer by Lahey and Beasley (2009), v.31, to construct 
all resumes, whose format and structure mirror those used by real Beca 18 recipients obtained 
thanks to PRONABEC.10 Two key variables for the experimental operation include the allocation 
of being recipient of Beca 18 and surnames, our major ethnic signal. Randomly assigned, two 
resumes indicated the job applicant had received Beca 18, while the remaining two did not. In 
terms of the surnames, each full name in the resume included a paternal and maternal surname, 
as is common in Peru. 
As explained below in more detail, we have four equally likely combinations of paternal-maternal 
names by combining indigenous and mixed-race surnames: Indigenous-Indigenous (I-I), 
Mestizo-Indigenous (M-I), Indigenous-Mestizo (I-M), and Mestizo-Mestizo (M-M). In terms of 
gender, each resume had a 50% chance of listing a woman’s name, from a common pool regardless 
of the type of surnames.11 All selected jobs were either for technical (requiring a 3-year college 
degree) or professional (5-year degree) occupations. We did not select low-skilled occupations as 
we focus on college graduates.
3.1 Beca 18 and education 
Half the resumes (per batch) sent to a job included the Beca 18 signal. We did this by assigning two 
possible wordings (randomly). The first wording said verbatim “Premios: Beca 18 (PRONABEC)” 
(Awards: Beca 18 (PRONABEC)). The second said “Beneficiario del Programa Nacional de Beca18 – 
PRONABEC” (Beneficiary of the National Program Beca 18 – PRONABEC). We use the male variation 
for “becario” in all resumes. While not gender neutral, this is a common practice in Peru. The 
selected statement was listed right below the name of the college assigned to the resume. We 
used administrative data to select the 3-year colleges—called Institutos de Educación Superior, 
or Institutos, for short—and the 5-year colleges (called universidades). This selection, as well as 
that of the college majors, largely responded to the characteristics of the job vacancies posted.12 
We further gathered information about whether the college and/or major was prioritized or 
not prioritized by the National Program of Scholarships and Education Loans (PRONABEC, for 
its acronym in Spanish), the public office from the Ministry of Education running the Beca 18 
Program. 
3.2 Signaling indigenous status
In Peru, as in many other Latin American countries, the use of two surnames (paternal and 
maternal, in that order) is widespread, for official identification purposes and also for job 
applications. In the latest population census, around a quarter of the population self-identifies 
as indigenous, with Quechua and Aimara being the largest groups among them. These groups 
have distinctive surnames and have been used in the literature before (e.g., Galarza and Yamada, 
2014, 2017). 
We used two ways to signal indigenous status: surnames and whether the job applicant went 
to a high school in a province outside of Lima, which is more likely to be populated by a larger 
share of indigenous people. In the case of surnames, an innovation of our experiment is that 
we can assess different degrees of our indigenous status on callbacks. In particular, we selected 
Indigenous (I) and mestizos (mixed race) (M) surnames and created four combinations of paternal 
- maternal surnames: M-M, M-I, I-M, and I-I (See Figure 2). We thus can compare the mestizo job 
10 We did not include photographs in our resumes, which is not uncommon in Peru.
11 To our best knowledge, the performance of mestizos in labor access has not been analyzed elsewhere, with the only 
exception of Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vasquez (2014) for Mexico.
12 The set of majors financed by Beca 18 is sufficiently broad as to not impose a constrain in the set of occupations matched 
with the job vacancies available every week.
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applicant (M-M) with an Indigenous job candidate of any of the three types (paternal only: I-M, 
maternal only: M-I, or both: I-I).
Our second signal is the high school graduation in an Indigenous/rural place (a province outside 
of Lima). Except for the M-M category, in the remaining three categories, each resume had a 2/3 
chance of including the name of a high school located in a province, outside Lima. This signal 
may be considered a weaker signal of Indigenous status. To maximize our statistical power in the 
innovative aspect of our study, we sent four resumes for each job ad, each with one of the four 
combinations of surnames mentioned earlier.
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Brief personal statement
College signal (Beca 18/No Beca 18)
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Brief personal statement
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The surnames used in this experiment come from a random sample drawn from the full list 
of surnames from real recipients of Beca 18. To construct the identities, we first classified the 
surnames of these recipients as Indigenous (I) and Mestizos (M) and, then, took a random 
sample without replacement of 400 surnames (200 I and 200 M), to construct 200 unique (and 
fictitious) combinations of paternal + maternal surnames, which are used in resumes. Sample 
surnames include Aylas, Ccori, Huasasquiche, Incahuamán, Mallqui, Ñahuin, Pomasoncco, 
Quispe, Rimaycuna, Sayritupac, Vilca, and Ynga, for Indigenous; and Alvarado, Baldeón, Castro, 
Delgado, Espejo, Fuentes, Hurtado, Mora, Porras, Segura, Valencia, and Zavala, for Mestizos. It 
is worth mentioning that we did not find any Anglo-Saxon surname in the administrative data of 
the program, so we decided to use only Indigenous and Mestizo surnames.
We validated our selection of surnames by conducting a survey with 82 freshmen undergraduate 
students. For each surname, they chose one of these three categories, Mestizo, Indigenous, or 
Other. Of our 100 Indigenous surnames, students considered them as such 85%; and 76% for the 
100 Mestizo surnames. Our validation rates are in line with the findings from Button and Walker 
(2020) for Native Americans in the United States.
3.3 Age and given names
The age of the job applicant, inferred from the year of graduation from high school, was set 
in the early 20s. We used common a pool of first and middle names (e.g., Juan, María), which 
were randomly assigned without replacement, using a common basis for each of the four groups 
created from the surnames. Then, for each of the four elements of a job applicant’s full name 
(2 given names + 2 surnames) the random assignment was without replacement. This allowed 
us to create 200 unique full names where no name appears more than once in any of the four 
elements (first name, middle name, paternal surname and maternal surname).
3.4 Brief personal statements
As common in Lima’s labor market, every resume included a statement summarizing the profile 
of the job candidate in the form of a brief personal statement. They were randomly assigned, 
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without replacement, from a set of eleven gender neutral statements.
3.5 Residential addresses, e-mail addresses and telephone numbers
We created a database with 200 addresses, which were assigned at random with no replacement, 
every time we constructed the four resumes for each selected job ad. Moreover, for each of the 






Every set of four resumes sent to each job ad was randomly drawn from those choices. We used 
(four) unique cellphone numbers for each job applicant in response to a job ad. Each cellphone 
was assigned to one of our research assistants. Our assistants were instructed to answer phone 
calls and e-mails and register the information of the successful candidates.13 All invitations for an 
interview were promptly declined, to reduce the costs to the employers.
3.6 Job history 
Job applicants have two entries for work experience in their resumes: past and current (all of 
them have been working during their last year in college), for a total of 2 to 3 years. These work 
experiences are specific to each job vacancy (we have at least 4 of them to be allocated to each 
entry), were adapted from real work experiences posted online for similar occupations and were 
randomly assigned to each job applicant.
3.7 Other information 
English and Computing Skills: All resumes include a final section with information on the level 
of English and computing (Microsoft Office) proficiency. These levels were set at intermediate for 
the general case but were adjusted as requested by the job vacancy. All four job applicants for a 
given job ad, displayed the same level of proficiency, with the only change being the presentation 
format and wording. We further added any occupation-specific software requested in the job 
listing.
Formatting: Resumes vary independently and without replacement (when there are at least four 
choices) according to the four font types (e.g., Arial, Times New Roman), the alignment of the 
header with the name, residential address, email address and telephone (right, left, centered), 
heading of each section (e.g., education, work experience, other skills), heading format (in blue, 
in black, underlined, centered). Our database registers the type of format used for each resume 
sent.
13 Unlike other countries, setting up voice mails would not work in Peru, as callers almost never leave voice messages. 




We sent 3,548 resumes between July 2019 and March 2020,14 in response to 887 job vacancies 
selected from help-wanted sections of newspapers in Lima, Peru. Power analysis suggested to 
send at least 2,210 resumes in order to detect a minimum effect of 0.07, for an intra-conglomerate 
correlation of 0.1, a significance level of 0.05 and a power of 0.8. Correcting that figure for the 
loss of variance resulting from sending more than one resume for each job listing (as in Lahey and 
Beasly, 2018) yielded a sample size of 2,873. Given that this power calculation uses as a reference 
studies for Peru that compare Whites with Indigenous, but we are comparing Mestizos with 
Indigenous (an effect more difficult to detect), our sample size required an additional upward 
adjustment. 
4.2 Occupations 
In terms of the occupations selected, we have a much broader types of jobs relative to most of the 
field experimental literature (as reviewed by Neumark, 2018 and Baertl, 2018). These are shown 
in Appendix Table 2 and largely responds to what the labor market demands. These occupations 
correspond to two types of jobs: technical (54% of our sample) and professional jobs (46%).
4.3 Identifying job ads
We identified potential job ads from the job listings published in two popular newspapers in Lima, 
El Trome and El Comercio, which print hundreds of ads from all economic activities. We did not 
restrict our selection to any particular occupational category. However, we excluded job ads that 
required in-person delivery of the resume or asked to include salary expectations in the resume. 
We also excluded ads for advanced managerial positions and rather focused on entry-level jobs, 
with up to three years of work experience, in almost all cases for a recent graduate. Appendix 3 
shows a complete batch (four resumes) sent in response to a graphical design position.
4.4 Emailing resumes
Resumes were electronically sent between Monday afternoon and Thursday morning each week 
(with a few exceptions) using Thunderbird. We used its “Send later” extension to schedule the 
sending of emails at different times of the day. Copies of all incoming went to a master email 
account, to keep a record of each submission. We only sent resumes for one job listing per firm 
or employer. Every email sent in the batch of four had a different opening, body, and closing, to 
ensure that employers would not notice these job applications were related. Text in the email 
was short, standardized and gender neutral.
4.5 Coding responses
We coded responses as positive (“We are calling to set a job interview”), ambiguous (“Could you 
please send a copy of your ID”) or negative (“Thanks for your application, but we have filled the 
position”). For the analysis in this paper, we consider only positive responses as callbacks.
4.6 Balance tests
Appendix Table 4 shows that the randomization of each element of the resumes was successful 
across treatment and control groups, that is, comparing resumes with and without the Beca 
18 statements. Out of 371 variables, less than 2% of them (7 variables) are unbalanced at the 
5% significance level. None remain unbalanced when accounting for multiple hypothesis testing 
using FDR-q adjustments of the p-values.
14 We had to stop the data collection due to the Covid-19 pandemic, when the Peruvian government declared a national 




We estimate the following equation, using Ordinary Least Squares (similar results are obtained 
using Probit models):
Callbackij=β0+β1Beca 18ij+βC Controlsij+αj+εij,
where Callbackij is equal to one if resume i received a callback in response to job ad j; Beca 
18ij equals 1, if the resume included a statement about being recipient of such scholarship; 
Controlsij is a vector of controls, for which we have three versions: (i) no controls; (ii) regular 
controls, which include controls at the individual level—sex, ethnicity (3 categories of surnames: 
Indigenous–Indigenous, Indigenous–Mestizo, and Mestizo–Indigenous, with Mestizo–Mestizo, 
as the base category), district of residence (to control for the socioeconomic status of the job 
applicant), type of occupation (technical or professional), whether the applicant graduated from 
a high school located in an indigenous location, or in Lima, and  the phone number used in 
the job application—and job level—whether the major was prioritized and whether the college 
was prioritized 15—in addition to the week the job was posted; and (iii) full controls (which adds 
controls at the resume level: format and style). We further include job ad fixed effects, αj, and 
correct the standard errors for clustering at the resume level in all specifications.
15 We use indicator variables for these two cases.
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6. Results
6.1. Aggregate effect of Beca 18
We first examine the mean (raw) callback rates by Beca 18 status, for each category of interest. As 
Table 3 shows, the callback rates for job applicants that indicated to be recipients of Beca 18 in 
their resumes are higher than for those who did not (the former receives 20% more callbacks than 
the latter). And this “Beca 18 effect” holds for all Indigenous categories considered (surnames 
and place of origin) and both genders, though the sample size for each category outlined below 
does not always allow to get statistical significance.
Table 3: Mean callbacks by ethnicity





A. Surnames (Paternal — Maternal)
Indigenous—Indigenous 887 10.03 9.05 11.01 0.3310
Mestizo—Indigenous 887 9.02 8.33 9.74 0.4633
Indigenous—Mestizo 887 11.72 9.93 13.44 0.1048
Mestizo—Mestizo 887 10.60 10.38 10.81 0.8363
B. Place of Origin
Rural High School 1559 10.58 9.52 11.62 0.1781
Lima High School 1989 10.16 9.33 11.00 0.2195
Gender
Female 1798 11.96 11.27 12.65 0.3661
Male 1750 8.68 7.48 9.87 0.0752
Total 3548 10.34 9.41 11.27 0.0689
 1/ Two-sided test p-value.
The effects indicated above do not account for clustering nor do they control for the type of 
college, occupation, or district of residence. This is addressed in Table 4, which reports the 
Beca 18 estimates from Equation (1). The estimate with no controls (column 1) shows that a 
resume listing Beca 18 has a higher chance of receiving a callback for a job interview than a 
similarly-qualified resume not listing the scholarship. The Beca 18 premium is meaningful as it 
increases in 20% the callback (=0.019/0.094). Adding candidate controls (column 2), job controls 
(column 3), and indicator variables for the week the job was posted (column 4) confirms the 20% 
difference in callbacks. The specification in column 4, which includes the regular controls, is our 
preferred one, and will be used in all remaining estimations.
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Table 4: Regression results on callbacks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Beca 18 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.020***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Randomized Inference: p-value [0.014] [0.009] [0.012] [0.016] [0.010]
Candidate controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Week fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Resume controls No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.481 0.485 0.486 0.486 0.484
Mean control (callback for Beca 18 
non-recipients) 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094
N 3548 3548 3548 3548 3548
Notes: Candidate controls include sex, ethnicity, district of residence, type of occupation; Job controls include indicators for prioritized major and college; Resume 
controls include several resume’s format and style indicators (personal statements, headings style, font types, personal information style). All specifications include 
a constant term and job ad fixed effects. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the resume level. P-values using randomized inference (with 1000 
repetitions) in square brackets.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Furthermore, our estimates are robust to the inclusion of full controls (column 5); in fact, doing 
so only increases the magnitude and significance of our estimate (yielding a 21% difference in 
callbacks). Additional robustness checks include the use of clustered standard errors at the job 
ad level, as in Lahey and Beasley (2009), Button and Walker (2020) and Beam et al. (2020), and 
applying randomized inference, as in Young (2019) and Imbens and Rubin (2015). Our main results 
are robust to those alternative estimations (see Appendix Table 5 for results with clustering at the 
job ad level, and row 3 in Table 4 for the randomized inference’s p-values). 
To put our Beca 18 coefficient estimate (20%) in perspective, it is equivalent to 44% of the premium 
from graduating from the top six colleges in our sample (Pontifical Catholic University of Peru—
PUCP, National University of Engineering—UNI, Peruvian University Cayetano Heredia—UPCH, 
Southern Scientific University—UCSur, TECSUP, and the National Service of Training in Industrial 
Work—SENATI).16 An additional comparison of our estimate with a related study (Galarza and 
Yamada, 2017) indicates that it may help reduce the beauty gap in employment access by 25% 
and the racial gap by 37%, though in that study the ethnic groups under scrutiny were Whites 
and Indigenous, both defined as having the paternal and maternal surnames from the referred 
category. All these findings indicate that the ability signal of Beca 18 dominates the negative 
poverty signal.
6.2 Heterogenous effects
To understand the relative role of the ability and poverty signal of Beca 18 we divide the sample 
in different groups according to where the poor are over- or under-represented. Our hypothesis 
is that the poverty signal will be larger in jobs, careers and for groups where the poor are 
under-represented. We start with splitting the sample by college type: 5-year vs. 3-year. There 
is a marked difference between universities (5-year colleges) and Institutos (3-year colleges), in 
terms of average tuition costs. With figures for 2015, the total average tuition cost of attending 
an Instituto in Lima was PEN 73.328 (equivalent to USD 21,500 at that time), PEN 162.883 for 
private universities, and PEN 80.759 for public universities (Apoyo, 2015). Specially comparing 
Institutos and private universities, this difference in tuition costs, may indicate a disparity in 
the socioeconomic status of the student population. This is further confirmed with data from 
representative household surveys. Students from low-socioeconomic status families are 2.8 
times more likely to graduate from a 3-year college relative to a 5-year college. For students 
16 Those colleges score within the top 10 universities and the top 5 Institutos, as of 2018 (SUNEDU, 2018).
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from high-socioeconomic status families the ratio is 0.25.17  Thus, we expect the Beca 18 callback 
premium to be larger for candidates from 3-year colleges. This is shown and confirmed in Table 
6.
Table 6 presents estimates from estimating equation (1) by type of college: for 3-year colleges 
(Institutos) and 5-year colleges (universities). Column 1 reports the estimate for all sample, for 
comparison. In column 2, when restricting the sample only to Institutos is there a significant 
effect: graduates from Institutos that received Beca 18 increase their chances to get a callback by 
39.2% (=0.031/0.079) relative to those without a scholarship. In the case of universities, column 
3, though those graduates with a Beca 18 receive 6.2% more callbacks (=0.007/0.112) than those 
without such scholarship, the coefficient is not statistically significant. This result suggests 
different dynamics within each segment of the labor market, with the ability signal prevailing 
over the poverty signal in the case of Institutos.







Beca 18 0.019** 0.031*** 0.007
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
Randomized Inference: p-value [0.016] [0.002] [0.539]
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.410 0.561
Regular controls Yes Yes Yes
Mean control (callback for Beca 18 non-recipients) 0.094 0.079 0.112
N 3548 1903 1645
Note: All specifications include a constant term and job ad fixed effects. All specifications include a constant term and job ad fixed effects. Robust standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the resume level. P-values using randomized inference (with 1000 repetitions) in square brackets.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
PRONABEC, the Peruvian government office administering the Beca 18 program, has a list of 
prioritized colleges and careers that is used at every scholarship call. The criteria used for this 
prioritization are broadly based on quality indicators (see notes to Appendix Figure 1, for details). 
Yet, the poor are under-represented in these colleges and careers. Table 7 reports the estimates 
breaking the sample by these categories. As seen below, the effect of Beca 18 for non-prioritized 
colleges is 58.5%, while that for prioritized colleges is 20.0%. This result is consistent with our 
prior findings.







Beca 18 0.019** 0.018** 0.072**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.036)
Randomized Inference: p-value [0.016] [0.030] [0.023]
Regular controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.483 0.558
Mean control (callback for Beca 18 non-recipients) 0.094 0.090 0.123
N 3548 3114 434
Note: All specifications include a constant term and job ad fixed effects. All specifications include a constant term and job ad fixed effects. Robust standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the resume level. P-values using randomized inference (with 1000 repetitions) in square brackets.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
17 We use data from the Peruvian National Household Survey (ENAHO, for its acronym in Spanish), which provides 
socioeconomic information, representative at the region level. We pooled the surveys from 2009 to 2019, for the 
population between ages 22-35, with some college education (complete or not), but no longer enrolled in college 
(dropouts or graduates). We further restricted the sample to those living with their parents (for ages 22-25, roughly 70% 
of them lived with at least one parent). The reported figures correspond to Metropolitan Lima. Low (high) socioeconomic 
status refers to the lowest (highest) quintile of parents’ schooling, since schooling is highly correlated with poverty.
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In Table 8 we split the sample by the district of residence (in Lima city) assigned to the resume. 
Using the 2017 Poverty Map at the district level (INEI, 2019), we classify districts as poor (below 
the median) and affluent (above the median). Again, we continue to see a larger callback premium 
when the candidate resides in the randomly assigned poorer districts. A much smaller callback 
premium and not statistically significant is observed in the affluent districts. In Appendix Table 9 
we further divide the sample by this poverty level and by type of college. We find that the bulk of 
the effects come from job candidates from poorer districts who graduated from 3-year colleges. 
Overall, these results validate the hypothesis that the callback premium for Beca 18 is larger for 
candidates where the poor are over-represented. This suggests that the negative signal of the 
scholarship is not zero.18







Beca 18 0.019** 0.028*** 0.010
(0.007) (0.010) (0.022)
Randomized Inference: p-value [0.016] [0.004] [0.586]
Regular controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.515 0.424
Mean control (callback for Beca 18 non-recipients) 0.094 0.086 0.110
N 3548 2320 1228
Note: All specifications include a constant term and job ad fixed effects.
Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the resume level. P-values using randomized inference (with 1000 repetitions) in square brackets.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Beca 18 targets students from poor families. And poverty and ethnicity are correlated in Peru, 
with Indigenous being among the poorest of the poor. To examine whether the return to Beca 18 
differs by surname type, we add an interaction term to equation (1):
Callbackij=β0+β1Beca 18ij+βS Surname Typeij+βSB Surname 
Typeij*Beca 18ij+βC Controlsij+αj+εij,
where: Surname Type is a vector that includes three categories (Indigenous – Indigenous, 
Indigenous – Mestizo, and Mestizo – Indigenous). From this equation, estimated for all sample, 
3-year and 5-year colleges, we recover the estimates of interest, reported in Table 11. Those 
returns are relative to the average callback on non-recipients of Beca 18. Considering column 1, 
we see that job applicants, recipients of Beca 18, with paternal and maternal Indigenous surnames 
receive 37.7% more callbacks than applicants without Beca 18. This aggregate effect comes from 
the returns received by graduates from Institutos, where such return is 66.5% (column 2). Further 
note that the point estimate for Indigenous-Indigenous surnames is the highest among the four 
surname types, for the entire sample and each type of college, a result that suggests Beca 18 
could help reduce ethnic gaps in access to employment opportunities, at least for 3-year colleges.
18 Effects by gender are shown in Appendix Table 10. We find no difference in the Beca 18 premium by gender.
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Table 11. Returns to Beca 18 by surname type








Indigenous – Indigenous 0.377** 0.665** 0.226
(0.179) (0.301) (0.219)
Indigenous – Mestizo 0.022 -0.200 0.177
(0.189) (0.314) (0.231)
Mestizo – Indigenous 0.129 0.540* -0.166
(0.184) (0.307) (0.224)
Mestizo – Mestizo 0.258 0.558* 0.019
(0.183) (0.310) (0.219)
Adjusted R2 0.485 0.411 0.560
Mean control (callback for Beca 18 non-recipients) 0.094 0.079 0.112
N 3548 1903 1645
Note: All specifications include a constant term and job ad fixed effects.
Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the resume level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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7. Conclusion
Students from poor families in developing countries are largely under-represented in higher 
education. And Peru is not an exception: while there is almost no difference in access to primary 
education by household income levels, there is a 15 percentage points gap in access to secondary 
education between the richest quintile and the poorest quintile, and this gap increases to 44 
percentage points in the case of higher education. One of the policies implemented by the 
governments in developing countries to reduce such inequality has been the creation of financial 
aid and student loan programs. We evaluate the effect of the need-based and merit-based Beca 
18 program, which grants scholarships to attend 3-year and 5-year colleges in Peru. We find 
a significant effect of Beca 18 on employment opportunities for poor, talented students. This 
suggests that the ability signal dominates the poverty signal. Large callback premiums among 
the poor suggest that the poverty signal is not zero. We further observe that the Beca 18 effect is 
the largest for job applicants with both paternal and maternal Indigenous surnames. Taking our 
results in perspective, scaling-up this merit-based scholarship program would allow to reduce 
not only the socioeconomic gaps in college enrollment, but also the income ethnic gaps among 
college graduates (a result to which our paper relates). 
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Appendix Figure 1: Beca 18 Selection Process a
Source: Technical Dossier of the 2020 Call for Beca 18, PRONABEC (2020).
Notes:
a Mostly based on the 2019 scholarship call. Numbers within parenthesis are the students total in each stage of the process. 
b Additional points are given to applicants in priority situations (disability, active fireperson or children of fireperson, volunteers registered by the Ministry of Women 
and Vulnerable Populations or indigenous or afro-descendant population).
c The quality of the colleges and careers chosen by applicants is considered in the final allocation of scholarships. Quality indicators must be reliable and from and 
external source. For 5-year colleges, these indicators include, research (publications), teaching (degrees attained by faculty, and student/teacher ratio), graduates| 
wages, acceptance rate, and students’ perception about the services received, teaching, infrastructure and college reputation, while for 3-year colleges, includes, 
teaching (degrees and student/teacher ratio), graduates wages, acceptance rate, college physical infrastructure, Personal computer/student ratio, and share of 
graduates with a bachelor’s degree (Licenciate). 
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Appendix Table 2: Occupations used
Occupation N Share (%) Callback (%)
Accountant 56 1.6 3.57
Accounting Assistant 536 15.1 6.53
Business Administration Assistant 388 10.9 4.38
Business Administration/Management 228 6.4 4.39
Civil Engineering 102 2.9 3.92
Engineering (Others)1/ 238 6.7 15.13
Cooking 152 4.3 9.87
Cooking Assistant 112 3.2 18.75
Dental Assistant 80 2.3 5.00
Graphical/Fashion/Design 164 4.6 12.80
Lawyer 136 3.8 13.24
Logistics 56 1.6 12.50
Marketing 48 1.4 16.67
Nursing Assistant 60 1.7 10.00
Pharmaceutical Chemist 40 1.1 17.50
Physician/Nurse 144 4.1 24.31
Sales Representative 220 6.2 18.18
Secretary 136 3.8 8.09
Teacher (Primary and Secondary Education) 172 4.8 7.56
Technician in Mechanics 96 2.7 10.42
Technician in Electricity/Mechanics/Electronics 308 8.7 12.34
Others2/ 76 2.1 11.84
Technical Occupations 1903 53.6 9.25
Professional Occupations 1645 46.4 11.61
Total 3548 100.0 10.34
1/ Includes Agrarian, Chemical, Electric, Electronic, Environmental, Food, Forestry, Industrial, Planning, and Telecommunications 
Engineering.
2/ Includes Sociologist, Touristic Guide, Community Manager, Architect, Seamstress
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Appendix Table 4. Balance test
Beca 18
Yes No Difference p-value
male or female applicant 0.500 0.504 0.004 0.78307
eth__1 0.251 0.249 -0.003 0.83216
eth__2 0.250 0.250 0.000 1.00000
eth__3 0.251 0.249 -0.003 0.83216
eth__4 0.247 0.253 0.006 0.67165
title_style__1 0.333 0.348 0.015 0.31703
title_style__2 0.338 0.321 -0.017 0.22849
title_style__3 0.329 0.331 0.003 0.84527
phone_format__1 0.255 0.245 -0.009 0.47989
phone_format__2 0.238 0.262 0.023* 0.07732
phone_format__3 0.255 0.245 -0.010 0.43708
phone_format__4 0.252 0.248 -0.004 0.77750
phone_number__1 0.259 0.241 -0.019 0.15763
phone_number__2 0.251 0.249 -0.003 0.83216
phone_number__3 0.239 0.261 0.022 0.10414
phone_number__4 0.250 0.250 0.000 1.00000
email__1 0.251 0.249 -0.003 0.83216
email__2 0.250 0.250 0.000 1.00000
email__3 0.251 0.249 -0.003 0.83216
email__4 0.247 0.253 0.006 0.67165
fonts__1 0.257 0.243 -0.014 0.28926
fonts__2 0.237 0.263 0.026** 0.04787
fonts__3 0.254 0.246 -0.007 0.57195
fonts__4 0.252 0.248 -0.005 0.72391
objective__1 0.082 0.098 0.015* 0.07791
objective__2 0.097 0.087 -0.010 0.24374
objective__3 0.096 0.083 -0.013 0.14825
objective__4 0.096 0.088 -0.007 0.39658
objective__5 0.087 0.089 0.002 0.82903
objective__6 0.095 0.088 -0.007 0.39549
objective__7 0.098 0.095 -0.003 0.75589
objective__8 0.089 0.094 0.005 0.59623
objective__9 0.078 0.098 0.020** 0.02038
objective__10 0.089 0.089 0.000 0.95720
objective__11 0.093 0.091 -0.002 0.83216
edu_style__1 0.251 0.249 -0.002 0.88764
edu_style__2 0.243 0.257 0.013 0.32261
edu_style__3 0.248 0.252 0.005 0.72391
edu_style__4 0.258 0.242 -0.016 0.22972
edu_edit__1 0.203 0.192 -0.011 0.37671
edu_edit__2 0.196 0.202 0.006 0.61828
edu_edit__3 0.190 0.210 0.020* 0.09986
edu_edit__4 0.210 0.196 -0.014 0.27006
edu_edit__5 0.202 0.200 -0.002 0.87873
work_style__1 0.253 0.247 -0.006 0.67165
work_style__2 0.246 0.254 0.008 0.52489
work_style__3 0.262 0.238 -0.023* 0.07732
work_style__4 0.240 0.260 0.021 0.12008
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work_edit__1 0.203 0.192 -0.011 0.37671
work_edit__2 0.196 0.202 0.006 0.61828
work_edit__3 0.190 0.210 0.020* 0.09986
work_edit__4 0.210 0.196 -0.014 0.27006
work_edit__5 0.202 0.200 -0.002 0.87873
jobs_worked__1 0.159 0.178 0.019* 0.09366
jobs_worked__2 0.166 0.165 -0.001 0.90173
jobs_worked__3 0.161 0.178 0.018 0.12128
jobs_worked__4 0.167 0.165 -0.001 0.90184
jobs_worked__5 0.176 0.144 -0.032*** 0.00401
jobs_worked__6 0.027 0.026 -0.001 0.84946
jobs_worked__7 0.027 0.030 0.003 0.52199
jobs_worked__8 0.030 0.028 -0.002 0.71553
jobs_worked__9 0.014 0.010 -0.004 0.25520
jobs_worked__10 0.006 0.008 0.002 0.36755
jobs_worked__11 0.007 0.005 -0.002 0.43148
jobs_worked__12 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.69408
jobs_worked__13 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.31601
jobs_worked__14 0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.70461
jobs_worked__15 0.008 0.006 -0.002 0.46375
jobs_worked__16 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.23799
jobs_worked__17 0.010 0.006 -0.005* 0.08514
jobs_worked__18 0.008 0.007 -0.001 0.58876
jobs_worked__19 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.85223
jobs_worked__20 0.006 0.009 0.003 0.20711
jobs_worked2__1 0.185 0.191 0.006 0.63866
jobs_worked2__2 0.195 0.186 -0.009 0.45909
jobs_worked2__3 0.190 0.189 -0.000 0.96886
jobs_worked2__4 0.181 0.189 0.008 0.50322
jobs_worked2__5 0.120 0.126 0.006 0.54541
jobs_worked2__6 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.90605
jobs_worked2__7 0.015 0.016 0.001 0.71190
jobs_worked2__8 0.019 0.018 -0.001 0.73341
jobs_worked2__9 0.016 0.013 -0.003 0.37439
jobs_worked2__10 0.015 0.013 -0.002 0.51227
jobs_worked2__11 0.014 0.014 0.000 1.00000
jobs_worked2__12 0.011 0.012 0.001 0.77608
jobs_worked2__13 0.012 0.007 -0.005 0.11221
jobs_worked2__14 0.010 0.008 -0.001 0.62948
job_title__1 0.019 0.019 0.000 1.00000
job_title__2 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__3 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__4 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__5 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__6 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__7 0.049 0.049 0.000 1.00000
job_title__8 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__9 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__10 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__11 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__12 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
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job_title__13 0.004 0.004 0.000 1.00000
job_title__14 0.007 0.007 0.000 1.00000
job_title__15 0.006 0.006 0.000 1.00000
job_title__16 0.005 0.005 0.000 1.00000
job_title__17 0.004 0.004 0.000 1.00000
job_title__18 0.101 0.101 0.000 1.00000
job_title__19 0.003 0.003 0.000 1.00000
job_title__20 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__21 0.160 0.160 0.000 1.00000
job_title__22 0.019 0.019 0.000 1.00000
job_title__23 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__24 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__25 0.006 0.006 0.000 1.00000
job_title__26 0.003 0.003 0.000 1.00000
job_title__27 0.007 0.007 0.000 1.00000
job_title__28 0.004 0.004 0.000 1.00000
job_title__29 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__30 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__31 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__32 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__33 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__34 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__35 0.005 0.005 0.000 1.00000
job_title__36 0.007 0.007 0.000 1.00000
job_title__37 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__38 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__39 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__40 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__41 0.022 0.022 0.000 1.00000
job_title__42 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__43 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__44 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__45 0.033 0.033 0.000 1.00000
job_title__46 0.003 0.003 0.000 1.00000
job_title__47 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__48 0.020 0.020 0.000 1.00000
job_title__49 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__50 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__51 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__52 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__53 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__54 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__55 0.028 0.028 0.000 1.00000
job_title__56 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__57 0.003 0.003 0.000 1.00000
job_title__58 0.012 0.012 0.000 1.00000
job_title__59 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__60 0.025 0.025 0.000 1.00000
job_title__61 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__62 0.007 0.007 0.000 1.00000
job_title__63 0.027 0.027 0.000 1.00000
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job_title__64 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__65 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__66 0.004 0.004 0.000 1.00000
job_title__67 0.009 0.009 0.000 1.00000
job_title__68 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__69 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__70 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__71 0.004 0.004 0.000 1.00000
job_title__72 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__73 0.014 0.014 0.000 1.00000
job_title__74 0.004 0.004 0.000 1.00000
job_title__75 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__76 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__77 0.006 0.006 0.000 1.00000
job_title__78 0.003 0.003 0.000 1.00000
job_title__79 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__80 0.027 0.027 0.000 1.00000
job_title__81 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__82 0.004 0.004 0.000 1.00000
job_title__83 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__84 0.018 0.018 0.000 1.00000
job_title__85 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__86 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__87 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__88 0.007 0.007 0.000 1.00000
job_title__89 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__90 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__91 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__92 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__93 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__94 0.011 0.011 0.000 1.00000
job_title__95 0.033 0.033 0.000 1.00000
job_title__96 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__97 0.003 0.003 0.000 1.00000
job_title__98 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__99 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__100 0.003 0.003 0.000 1.00000
job_title__101 0.008 0.008 0.000 1.00000
job_title__102 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__103 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__104 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__105 0.008 0.008 0.000 1.00000
job_title__106 0.009 0.009 0.000 1.00000
job_title__107 0.009 0.009 0.000 1.00000
job_title__108 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__109 0.005 0.005 0.000 1.00000
job_title__110 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__111 0.007 0.007 0.000 1.00000
job_title__112 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__113 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__114 0.003 0.003 0.000 1.00000
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job_title__115 0.007 0.007 0.000 1.00000
job_title__116 0.004 0.004 0.000 1.00000
job_title__117 0.011 0.011 0.000 1.00000
job_title__118 0.026 0.026 0.000 1.00000
job_title__119 0.002 0.002 0.000 1.00000
job_title__120 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__121 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__122 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__123 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__124 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__125 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__126 0.038 0.038 0.000 1.00000
job_title__127 0.017 0.017 0.000 1.00000
job_title__128 0.011 0.011 0.000 1.00000
job_title__129 0.005 0.005 0.000 1.00000
job_title__130 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__131 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__132 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__133 0.007 0.007 0.000 1.00000
job_title__134 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__135 0.003 0.003 0.000 1.00000
job_title__136 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
job_title__137 0.001 0.001 0.000 1.00000
additional_info__1 0.335 0.336 0.001 0.94835
additional_info__2 0.352 0.334 -0.018 0.22068
additional_info__3 0.313 0.330 0.017 0.23843
software__1 0.256 0.244 -0.011 0.39656
software__2 0.242 0.258 0.016 0.22972
software__3 0.254 0.246 -0.008 0.52489
software__4 0.248 0.252 0.004 0.77750
week__1 0.037 0.037 0.000 1.00000
week__2 0.032 0.032 0.000 1.00000
week__3 0.057 0.057 0.000 1.00000
week__4 0.022 0.022 0.000 1.00000
week__5 0.041 0.041 0.000 1.00000
week__6 0.043 0.043 0.000 1.00000
week__7 0.029 0.029 0.000 1.00000
week__8 0.043 0.043 0.000 1.00000
week__9 0.040 0.040 0.000 1.00000
week__10 0.031 0.031 0.000 1.00000
week__11 0.054 0.054 0.000 1.00000
week__12 0.039 0.039 0.000 1.00000
week__13 0.031 0.031 0.000 1.00000
week__14 0.042 0.042 0.000 1.00000
week__15 0.027 0.027 0.000 1.00000
week__16 0.043 0.043 0.000 1.00000
week__17 0.043 0.043 0.000 1.00000
week__18 0.025 0.025 0.000 1.00000
week__19 0.034 0.034 0.000 1.00000
week__20 0.011 0.011 0.000 1.00000
week__21 0.022 0.022 0.000 1.00000
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week__22 0.018 0.018 0.000 1.00000
week__23 0.024 0.024 0.000 1.00000
week__24 0.019 0.019 0.000 1.00000
week__25 0.042 0.042 0.000 1.00000
week__26 0.037 0.037 0.000 1.00000
week__27 0.018 0.018 0.000 1.00000
week__28 0.014 0.014 0.000 1.00000
week__29 0.020 0.020 0.000 1.00000
week__30 0.012 0.012 0.000 1.00000
week__31 0.021 0.021 0.000 1.00000
week__32 0.029 0.029 0.000 1.00000
hs_name__1 0.006 0.003 -0.003 0.10757
hs_name__2 0.025 0.020 -0.005 0.25867
hs_name__3 0.044 0.052 0.008 0.19871
hs_name__4 0.023 0.028 0.005 0.32985
hs_name__5 0.022 0.019 -0.002 0.58820
hs_name__6 0.024 0.024 -0.000 0.92057
hs_name__7 0.025 0.020 -0.005 0.25867
hs_name__8 0.019 0.024 0.005 0.24388
hs_name__9 0.050 0.053 0.003 0.62733
hs_name__10 0.020 0.021 0.001 0.74528
hs_name__11 0.007 0.005 -0.001 0.54744
hs_name__12 0.047 0.049 0.002 0.77418
hs_name__13 0.051 0.052 0.000 0.94494
hs_name__14 0.022 0.023 0.002 0.67976
hs_name__15 0.028 0.018 -0.009** 0.04098
hs_name__16 0.022 0.027 0.006 0.23364
hs_name__17 0.023 0.022 -0.001 0.83810
hs_name__18 0.023 0.025 0.002 0.61808
hs_name__19 0.019 0.021 0.001 0.74247
hs_name__20 0.018 0.026 0.007* 0.09521
hs_name__21 0.026 0.028 0.002 0.70660
hs_name__22 0.028 0.024 -0.003 0.50093
hs_name__23 0.026 0.023 -0.003 0.48925
hs_name__24 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.24766
hs_name__25 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.56326
hs_name__26 0.023 0.021 -0.003 0.53157
hs_name__27 0.027 0.021 -0.006 0.22922
hs_name__28 0.048 0.043 -0.005 0.46256
hs_name__29 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.43789
hs_name__30 0.048 0.036 -0.012** 0.04771
hs_name__31 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.24766
hs_name__32 0.005 0.005 0.000 1.00000
hs_name__33 0.042 0.037 -0.005 0.38532
hs_name__34 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.68233
hs_name__35 0.044 0.057 0.013* 0.05057
hs_name__36 0.020 0.020 0.000 1.00000
hs_name__37 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.22443
hs_name__38 0.046 0.047 0.001 0.82764
hs_name__39 0.023 0.023 0.000 0.91903
hs_name__40 0.051 0.052 0.001 0.83587
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hs_name__41 0.004 0.001 -0.003** 0.03460
hs_name__42 0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.46608
hs2_name__1 0.050 0.052 0.002 0.72763
hs2_name__2 0.010 0.009 -0.000 0.87534
hs2_name__3 0.052 0.051 -0.001 0.88992
hs2_name__4 0.024 0.025 0.001 0.84266
hs2_name__5 0.024 0.023 -0.000 0.91981
hs2_name__6 0.010 0.010 0.000 1.00000
hs2_name__7 0.010 0.008 -0.002 0.42133
hs2_name__8 0.008 0.011 0.003 0.27209
hs2_name__9 0.042 0.047 0.005 0.41322
hs2_name__10 0.026 0.020 -0.007 0.15258
hs2_name__11 0.056 0.051 -0.004 0.54108
hs2_name__12 0.046 0.051 0.005 0.47524
hs2_name__13 0.044 0.040 -0.005 0.44643
hs2_name__14 0.021 0.026 0.005 0.26809
hs2_name__15 0.020 0.029 0.009* 0.06048
hs2_name__16 0.011 0.012 0.001 0.66652
hs2_name__17 0.008 0.011 0.003 0.35228
hs2_name__18 0.022 0.018 -0.004 0.32423
hs2_name__19 0.008 0.005 -0.003 0.25538
hs2_name__20 0.022 0.020 -0.001 0.74800
hs2_name__21 0.026 0.023 -0.002 0.62136
hs2_name__22 0.013 0.008 -0.005 0.13830
hs2_name__23 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.86526
hs2_name__24 0.008 0.012 0.004 0.21487
hs2_name__25 0.045 0.037 -0.008 0.18953
hs2_name__26 0.025 0.028 0.003 0.56905
hs2_name__27 0.028 0.021 -0.007 0.13468
hs2_name__28 0.046 0.055 0.008 0.20887
hs2_name__29 0.046 0.044 -0.002 0.76887
hs2_name__30 0.021 0.010 -0.011*** 0.00404
hs2_name__31 0.043 0.043 -0.000 0.93979
hs2_name__32 0.015 0.014 -0.001 0.70344
hs2_name__33 0.019 0.017 -0.001 0.73016
hs2_name__34 0.012 0.019 0.007* 0.08247
hs2_name__35 0.023 0.025 0.001 0.76483
hs2_name__36 0.018 0.020 0.002 0.65175
hs2_name__37 0.013 0.019 0.006 0.11467
hs2_name__38 0.021 0.027 0.006 0.19058
hs2_name__39 0.016 0.023 0.007 0.12295
hs2_name__40 0.021 0.014 -0.007 0.10069
hs2_name__41 0.020 0.014 -0.006 0.11981
DistritoResidencia__1 0.046 0.048 0.002 0.77315
DistritoResidencia__2 0.034 0.027 -0.007 0.21249
DistritoResidencia__3 0.056 0.052 -0.004 0.58771
DistritoResidencia__4 0.015 0.017 0.002 0.54406
DistritoResidencia__5 0.024 0.021 -0.003 0.53578
DistritoResidencia__6 0.076 0.063 -0.013 0.10439
DistritoResidencia__7 0.074 0.071 -0.004 0.63716
DistritoResidencia__8 0.050 0.045 -0.005 0.47319
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DistritoResidencia__9 0.081 0.074 -0.007 0.39079
DistritoResidencia__10 0.057 0.046 -0.011 0.11062
DistritoResidencia__11 0.049 0.052 0.003 0.62583
DistritoResidencia__12 0.021 0.026 0.006 0.22473
DistritoResidencia__13 0.054 0.050 -0.004 0.58143
DistritoResidencia__14 0.049 0.055 0.006 0.40826
DistritoResidencia__15 0.022 0.030 0.007 0.12556
DistritoResidencia__16 0.024 0.027 0.003 0.55880
DistritoResidencia__17 0.035 0.035 0.000 1.00000
DistritoResidencia__18 0.040 0.048 0.008 0.20371
DistritoResidencia__19 0.040 0.048 0.008 0.17946
DistritoResidencia__20 0.032 0.031 -0.001 0.86069
DistritoResidencia__21 0.029 0.031 0.002 0.65495
DistritoResidencia__22 0.093 0.102 0.009 0.32746
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Appendix Table 5. Regression with clusters at the job ad level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Beca 18 0.019*** 0.019** 0.018** 0.018** 0.019***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Randomized Inference: p-value [0.072] [0.068] [0.078] [0.074] [0.071]
Candidate controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Week fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Resume. controls No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.007 0.009 0.043 0.039
Mean control 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094
Number of clusters 887 887 887 887 887
N 3548 3548 3548 3548 3548
   Robust standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the job ad level.
      * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix Table 9. Effects by college type and poverty level of district of residence
All
3-year college 5-year college
Poor district Affluent district Poor district Affluent district
Beca 18 0.019** 0.042*** 0.027 0.010 0.001
(0.007) (0.014) (0.036) (0.014) (0.027)
Randomized Inference: p-value [0.016] [0.000] [0.370] [0.511] [0.960]
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.439 0.248 0.588 0.611
Mean control 0.094 0.071 0.092 0.102 0.133
N 3548 1253 650 1067 578
Note: All specifications include a constant term and job ad fixed effects.  
Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the resume level. P-values using randomized inference (with 1000 repetitions) in square brackets.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix Table 10: Returns to Beca 18 by gender
(1) (2) (3)
All 3-year college 5-year college
Beca 18 0.023** 0.027* 0.015
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015)
Woman 0.031*** 0.030* 0.026
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Beca 18*Woman -0.008 0.008 -0.016
(0.017) (0.023) (0.024)
Regular controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.485 0.410 0.560
Mean control (callback for Beca 18 non-recipients) 0.094 0.079 0.112
N 3548 1903 1645
Note: All specifications include a constant term and job ad fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the resume level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
